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Introduction 
Attempts to impose a new global economic order are not a recentphenomenon. In the 1960s and ‘70s, developing countries tried toachieve this within the framework of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but in the absence of a credible
leader they did not have much success. Recently, it seems that China has
launched a new offensive with this in mind, seeking, if certain analysts are
to be believed, to impose its own vision as the world’s second-largest eco-
nomic superpower, with the intention of becoming the first. Having sup-
ported the Beijing Consensus instead of the Washington Consensus, China (1)
may be in the process not only of reshaping, but also of redefining the global
economic order, by establishing new institutions such as the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
How can China’s change in stance be explained, when until now it has
kept a relatively low profile? How are we to interpret this, and what might
be the consequences? What is the exact nature of these initiatives? Can
we in fact speak of the emergence of a new, Chinese-style global economic
order? These are the questions that this article will endeavour to answer.
With that in mind, the article will re-examine China’s recent initiatives
within a longer-term perspective. First of all, it will give an overview of
China’s strategy in the face of the global economic order as defined and
imposed following the Second World War, then it will look at how China’s
position in matters of international economic governance has evolved in
tandem with its economic take-off, and finally it will analyse the various
initiatives taken recently by Beijing, in order to determine whether we really
are heading for a new global economic order dominated by China. 
China and the international economic order
of Bretton Woods: (2) From collaboration to
contestation
China, beneficiary of the Bretton Woods Agreement
Throughout the whole period of development and reform (which began
in the late 1970s), China remained largely marginalised from the governance
of international economic order as defined by Western powers in the wake
of the Second World War. Nor indeed did it attempt to challenge this order:
in fact, China even seemed quite comfortable with an economic order ruled
by America and the West, be it in a commercial or a monetary capacity. 
As a result, China was able to benefit considerably, for example, from aid
from the World Bank. After joining the institution in 1980, the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC) became one of the institution’s main “clients,” bor-
rowing over $40 billion over the course of a quarter of a century, and
subsequently funding nearly 300 investment projects, with one of the high-
est success rates ever recorded by the institution. (3) Although this financial
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1. In this article, the term “China” refers exclusively to the People’s Republic of China. 
2. For a more detailed analysis of the evolving relationship between China and international trade
governance, see Henry Gao, “From the Periphery to the Centre: China’s Participation in WTO Ne-
gotiations,” China Perspectives, No. 2012/1, pp. 59-65, and Françoise Nicolas, “La Chine et les in-
stitutions économiques multilatérales, entre révisionnisme et statu quo” (China’s role in
multilateral economic institutions: Between revisionism and status quo), Politique étrangère, No.
2014/3, pp. 49-61.
3. China successively drew on resources from the International Development Association (IDA) (until
1999), then on resources from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
After becoming an upper-middle income economy, China used aid from IBRD for small-scale proj-
ects, and itself became a contributor to the IDA fund. 
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aid was considerable, it still accounted for less than 1% of total investment
in the country, and in terms of investment per capita remained far below
what had been observed in other developing countries. For this reason, it
could not be held responsible for the country’s strong economic perform-
ance.
As well as receiving financial aid from the World Bank, the PRC also ben-
efited from its technical assistance services and training activities. Interest-
ingly – and surprisingly – enough, the Bank has never curtailed China in its
choice of economic policy, having accepted right from the start that China’s
development strategy would be a unique case. (4) A report published in 2007
examines in detail China’s contributions to the institution, alongside the
benefits that the PRC received through its cooperation with the Bank. (5)
Relations between China and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were
no more complex. While China never received financial assistance from the
Fund, (6) it was nevertheless able to take full advantage of cooperating with
the institution by making regular use of its technical assistance services,
and by holding regular consultations on its options for macroeconomic pol-
icy. In fact, China regularly followed the recommendations it was given, for
example by devaluing the yuan in 1986. (7)
Given their ideological differences, it was therefore surprising that China
tended more frequently to side with the IMF than with the institution’s de-
tractors. (8) Hence, during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, China did not
take up the cause of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), which could have un-
dermined the IMF’s control of the international monetary system. Admit-
tedly, the fact that the project originated in Japan was enough to make it
an unattractive prospect for Beijing, but there is little doubt that China’s
passivity while discussions were under way made it much easier for the
United States to torpedo the initiative. Likewise, China did not join in with
the large number of Asian countries that came together in their searing crit-
icism of the IMF’s management of the crisis. (9)
Finally, given the extrovert nature of its development strategy, China also
complied relatively willingly with the demands imposed by its trade partners
in the lead-up to its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). (10)
In joining, China’s leaders at the time were given the ability to push for quite
a few reforms, given that the industrial nations had demanded far stricter
requirements of China than of any other economy before allowing them to
attain membership. China can, incidentally, be considered one of the chief
beneficiaries of the Organization’s creation. Since then, it has played along
with the WTO’s game, broadly respecting the rules, even if its behaviour
doesn’t always match up to its commitments. Nevertheless, China gives its
support to the Organization, taking part not only in trade negotiations, in-
cluding certain multilateral agreements, (11) but also by participating in the
dispute settlement mechanism and by accepting the WTO’s decisions in
these matters. (12)
During its period of economic take-off, it was surprising that China did
not play a leading role in global governance, as its leaders were entirely pre-
occupied with issues of internal development. Generally, China accepted
the institutions as they were, and simply sought to take full advantage
wherever possible. 
China’s growing power and the first signs of
contestation
After a period of consistent double-figure growth, it was unavoidable that
the Chinese economy should disrupt the worldwide balance of power. Based
on GDP expressed in Purchasing Power Parity, China moved from 11th to
first place between 1980 and 2015, even if at current exchange rates Amer-
ica’s GDP remains very clearly in the lead (with $17,416 billion compared
to China’s $10,355 billion). (13)
This disruption of the global economic order is not only connected to
China’s significant growth, but also to the methods by which it has inte-
grated with the global economy. For instance, China’s largely export-based
growth strategy allowed the country to clear a systematic surplus from the
balance of its current transactions, which coupled with a surplus in the cap-
ital account fuelled principally by a massive influx of foreign investments
allowed it to accumulate colossal monetary reserves and led to a global fi-
nancial imbalance, which has long been blamed as a major cause of insta-
bility. The challenge for China is to manage these savings that give the
country such unequalled financial influence, while for the rest of the world
the challenge is to find a way to work around this new situation. 
Under these conditions, it’s only natural that China would seek, on the one
hand, to step out from under the wing of the international financial institu-
tions (IFIs) and on the other hand to increase its role in global governance.
• Initial tensions over managing the exchange rate 
The value of a country’s currency (and therefore the management of its
monetary policy) is an eminently political matter over which tensions can
easily arise. The powerful growth of emerging Asian economies and the
competition this creates for the markets of hitherto dominant economies
have perhaps predictably been met with accusations of manipulating ex-
change rates and undervaluing currency. China has been no exception to
this rule. 
While the analysis and advice of the IMF’s economists had always been
mostly positive regarding Beijing’s conduct with economic policy, the trend
was reversed between 2000 and 2010, with tensions mounting over the
issue of managing the yuan. Pressure exerted by the Fund in favour of re-
evaluating the Chinese currency (14) was met with vigorous resistance by the
Chinese authorities, who between 2007 and 2009 decided to block publi-
cation of the results of Article IV consultations by the Fund. (15) These early
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4. Pieter Bottelier, “China and the World Bank: How a Partnership Was Built,” Stanford Center for In-
ternational Development, Working Paper No. 277, April 2006.
5. World Bank, China and the World Bank: A Partnership for Innovation, Washington DC, World Bank,
2007. 
6. In 1981 and 1986, the PRC did, however, draw on its IMF credit tranche in order to consolidate
its currency reserves.
7. Margaret Pearson, “China’s Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime,” in
Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: Challenges and Prospects,
New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, pp. 161-205.
8. China’s position as a creditor is undoubtedly connected to this state of affairs. 
9. Yu Yongding, “IMF Reform: A Chinese View,” in Edwin Truman (ed.), Reforming the IMF for the 21st
Century, Special report 19, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 2006,
pp. 519-525.
10. China joined the WTO in 2001, after almost a decade of liberalisation efforts and reform. For
more on this, see Will Martin, “L’adhésion à l’OMC et les réformes économiques en Chine” (China:
Economic reform and the WTO), Politique étrangère, No. 2, 2004, pp. 331-346.
11. Such as, for instance, the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA). 
12. For more details on this, see Henry Gao, “From the Periphery to the Centre: China’s Participation
in WTO Negotiations,” art. cit.
13. While China accounted for less than 2% of the global GDP (in current dollars) in 1980, by 2011
its share had increased to 8%. 
14. This pressure was in line with criticisms of China made by certain American economists, particu-
larly those at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington (Morris Goldstein,
John Williamson, C. Fred Bergsten), who accused Beijing of manipulating its currency and keeping
it consistently undervalued in order to keep exports competitive. 
15. Peter Ferdinand and Jue Wang, “China and the IMF: From Mimicry towards Pragmatic International
Institutional Pluralism,” International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4, 2013, pp. 895-910. 
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signs of dissent marked the beginning of a less peaceful period between
Beijing and the IMF. 
• Challenging the internal governance of the IMF
Buoyed up by its growing economy, China (and with it all the other large
emerging economies, particularly the other BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, and
South Africa) would campaign to reform the way IFIs functioned, in partic-
ular to redistribute IMF voting shares in order to better represent the new
balance of power within the global economic order. These voting shares
play a crucial role, not only in determining the maximum amount of finan-
cial resources a country commits to provide to the IMF, but also in its access
to Fund resources and its say in the institution’s decision-making process.
Finally, after a series of long and arduous discussions that took place, no-
tably, within the G20, an agreement was reached in 2010 not only to double
the total number of voting shares, but also to transfer 6% of voting rights
from “developed countries” to “under-represented countries,” and also to
emerging countries and countries undergoing vigorous development (the
majority of which were Asian). 
China was the big winner of this debate: the reassignment of voting shares
meant that its share rose from 3.9% to 6.4% of the total, and that it be-
came the IMF’s third-largest stakeholder, behind the United States (17.4%)
and Japan (6.5%), but ahead of Germany (5.6%), France, and Great Britain
(4.2% each). (16) Alongside China, three other BRICS countries (Brazil, India,
and Russia) were also among the top ten shareholders. Reform remained
modest because China’s voting share was still far from representative of its
influence on the global economy, but it did at least take the new balance
better into account. All the same, it could in no way be said to fundamen-
tally challenge the ideological principles of the institution.
Rather surprisingly, especially since they lost nothing in the reallocation,
the United States initially refused to ratify the reform, thus preventing it
from being implemented. In fact, where decisions as important as this are
concerned (regarding the internal governance of the institution) it is nec-
essary to obtain a majority vote of 85%, (17) so, with 17.4% of the voting
shares, the United States holds a blocking minority (which gives them de
facto veto power). Despite repeated pressure from its peers, the United
States refused to give in. In April 2015, in a report published following the
annual spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank, it reiterated that “the
urgent implementation” of this reform was its “top priority,” without actu-
ally putting it into action: just 145 member states, accounting for 77% of
all voting shares, supported reform. It wasn’t until 18 December 2015 that
the United States finally acquiesced and gave the green light, meaning re-
form could be implemented. 
In summary, in the wake of its transformation into an economic super-
power, China’s stance shifted towards a more resolute desire to reform the
international monetary system. Nonetheless, China’s various initiatives ex-
isted within a paradigm of reforming the existing system only marginally,
without questioning its ideology or fundamentally challenging it in any way.
Recent years have seen a new trend appear: China has begun to take an in-
creasingly offensive stance, marked by a degree of revisionism. (18)
China’s new initiatives 
Reforming the international monetary system 
First, China’s stance in matters of financial cooperation would undergo
noticeable change, reflecting both a certain dissatisfaction with the existing
methods of multilateral cooperation and an increasingly clear desire to take
control, if not at the expense of, then at least in parallel with Japan. So, while
in 1998 China opposed Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund, bring-
ing indirect support to the IMF in its role as a source of financial aid, in 2000
it supported the Chiang Mai Initiative, which created a system of financial
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16. Brazil, India, and Korea are among the “winners,” while Europe was hit the hardest. Europe accounts
for most of the losses, even if certain countries such as Poland and Spain won a few extra votes.
Meanwhile, the United States lost nothing, because despite its significant influence on the global
economy, it still remains under-represented within the IMF. 
17. A “supermajority” such as this is necessary in order to pass reforms that affect both the growth
and the redistribution of voting shares and the make-up of the institution’s board of directors.
The situation could be “unblocked” by separating the two aspects of reform from each other.
18. The term “revisionism,” understood as a fundamental challenging of the established order, is bor-
rowed from Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is Peaceful Rise Possible?”, Chinese Jour-
nal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, pp. 5-36.
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Source: IMF, www.imf.org (accessed on 5 April 2016).
United states 17.661 United States 17.398
Japan 6.553 Japan 6.461
Germany 6.107 China 6.390
France 4.502 Germany 5.583
United Kingdom 4.502 France 4.225
China 3.994 United Kingdom 4.225
Italy 3.305 Italy 3.159
Saudi Arabia 2.929 India 2.749
Canada 2.670 Russia 2.705
Russia 2.493 Brazil 2.315
India 2.441 Canada 2.311
Netherlands 2.164 Saudi Arabia 2.095
Belgium 1.931 Spain 1.999
Brazil 1.782 Mexico 1.868
Spain 1.687 Netherlands 1.831
Post-reformPre-reform
Table 1 – IMF – 15 highest voting shares, before and after the 2010 reforms (in %)
aid between the countries of ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea, and Japan).
Furthermore, just over ten years later, China pushed for multilateralisation,
allowing the mechanism to become a veritable Asian monetary fund. (19)
Even if this initiative may at first have appeared largely symbolic, it received
active support at the highest state level. (20)
Secondly, China would also attack the workings of the international mon-
etary system, most notably by challenging the supremacy of the dollar. In
China’s eyes, other currencies should be accorded greater importance, in
order to limit the “exorbitant privilege” held by the United States. After
floating the possibility of resorting to a supranational currency inspired by
Keynes’ “bancor,” China suggested that Special Drawing Rights (SDR) should
be given the status of an international currency (21) and include the yuan as
an integral part of their make-up. (22) In 2010, the latter request was rejected
by the IMF on the basis that the yuan’s partial convertibility meant that it
did not fulfil all the necessary criteria. 
But China did not give up. In the wake of the American budget crisis of
2013, certain Chinese experts re-entered the fray, suggesting that a supra-
national reserve currency should be created, and calling for fundamental
reform of the international financial and monetary systems. Then in March
2015, armed with the yuan’s increasing power in international transac-
tions, (23) Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang submitted another formal re-
quest to IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, asking that the yuan be
included in the calculation of SDRs. After what has been portrayed as an
historic decision, China’s request was finally accepted in 2015, allowing the
yuan to become, as of October 2016, the fifth international reserve currency
(but the third in order of importance). Given the fact that SDRs are rarely
used, the value of this decision was essentially symbolic, but it created a
way for China to become involved with an institution charged with super-
vising the global monetary system, and thus gain its support. (24) To deprive
oneself of support from the economy with the largest currency reserves in
the world would have made little sense. 
At the same time, China pushed to internationalise its currency. The es-
tablishment of the Shanghai Pilot Free-Trade Zone in autumn 2013, per-
mitting unrestricted convertibility of the Chinese yuan and payment in yuan
for commercial exchanges, was done with this logic in mind, and helped to
give the Chinese currency greater clout within the international monetary
system. Likewise, the bilateral currency swap agreements recently passed
by the People’s Bank of China with the European Central Bank, but also with
central banks in emerging economies such as Thailand, Nigeria, and Ar-
gentina, are intended to promote diversification of international currency
reserves and the use of the Chinese currency on an international scale. Be-
yond internationalising the yuan, by seeking to impose the yuan as the
equal of the dollar, China does indeed seem to be hoping for a fundamental
reform of the international monetary system. 
That being said, the recent turbulent behaviour of the Chinese financial
markets and the authorities’ nervous reaction to this suggests that the total
liberalisation of the capital account and the complete convertibility of the
yuan could still take some time, and gives rise to doubts about the yuan’s
ability to compete with the dollar. 
Institutional innovations
The rise of this more aggressive stance has above all been visible through
a whole series of institutional innovations. The first of these initiatives is
the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank, which to a certain
extent constitutes an alternative to the World Bank. First conceived in 2013,
the project was relaunched in 2014 on the occasion of the BRICS summit
at Fortaleza in Brazil, leading to the institution being created in July 2015. (25)
The NDB was given $100 billion in capital. Its loans will notably be used to
fund infrastructure works and sustainable development projects (both public
and private) in BRICS and in other emerging economies. 
Meanwhile, a shared currency reserve fund of $100 billion was created
(the BRICS Contingency Fund). China would contribute $41 billion, Brazil,
India and Russia would each contribute $18 billion, and South Africa would
contribute $5 billion. Intended to provide member states with a means to
combat financial crises or a speculative attack on their currency, to a certain
extent this plan constitutes an alternative to the IMF.
But the real turning point in challenging the established order was without
doubt the formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) at
Beijing’s instigation. The idea was first floated in autumn 2013, after which
the AIIB project took shape with remarkable speed. Officially launched in
2014 when around 20 countries signed a draft treaty, the project became
a reality with the publication of the institution’s charter roughly eight
months later. To widespread astonishment, the project met with huge suc-
cess among a great many countries all over the world. Despite the United
States putting pressure on its allies not to support the project, a number of
Asia-Pacific countries (particularly South Korea and Australia) disregarded
the warning, and 17 European countries (including Great Britain, Germany,
France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, as well as Switzerland and Norway)
also decided to join in the endeavour, bringing the total number of founding
countries to 57.
As its name suggests, the purpose of this multilateral institution is to fa-
cilitate the funding of vast infrastructure projects in order to improve “con-
nectivity” between the different countries in the Asian Region. According
to the institution’s charter, which was made public in spring 2015, the ma-
jority (that is, 75%) of contributions must come from Asian countries. Quite
naturally given its economic heft, China holds the lion’s share, which
amounts to 30% of the capital. China’s dominant position is also reflected
in the distribution of voting shares, even if the influence of major share-
holders is limited by the fact that 15% of the voting shares are split equally
between the founder members, irrespective of the size of their contribution.
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19. The decision to shift to a multilateral arrangement was taken in December 2009 and came into
effect in March 2010; for more details see Françoise Nicolas, “Economic Regionalism in East Asia:
The End of an Exception?”, in Sarah Tong (ed.), Globalization, Development and Security in East
Asia (Vol. 2: Trade, Investment and Economic Integration), Singapore, World Scientific Publishing,
2014. 
20. For instance, from President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan; see
Mikko Huotari, “A New Role in East Asian Financial Order,” in Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick,
and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald (eds), China’s International Roles: Challenging or Supporting Interna-
tional Order?, New York, Routledge, 2016, pp. 150-167.
21. For more details on the purpose and terms of this proposal, see Claude Meyer, La Chine, banquier
du monde (China: Banker to the World), Paris, Fayard, 2014, Chapter 9; Michel Aglietta, “Un sys-
tème monétaire international équilibré” (A balanced international monetary system), Économie
politique, No. 45, January 2010, or Eswar Prasad, The Dollar Trap, Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 2014, Chapter 12. 
22. At that stage, the value of SDR was determined according to a basket of currencies that included
the dollar, the euro, the pound sterling, and the yen.
23. According to data from SWIFT, in November 2014 the yuan became the fifth-most popular in-
ternational payment currency, behind the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound sterling, but
now ahead of the Australian and Canadian dollar. 
24. See Barry Eichengreen, “China, the Responsible Stakeholder,” Project Syndicate, 10 June 2015; Li-
Gang Liu, “Why the West Should Welcome Chinese Yuan’s Inclusion into the SDR,” South China
Morning Post, 8 June 2015; and Zhang Jun, “China’s Pursuit of New Economic Order,” Project Syn-
dicate, 2 June 2015.
25. The first loans are anticipated in early 2016.
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This is the reason that China only holds 26% of the total number of voting
shares (see Graph 1). Since the decisions that affect major governance issues
(especially revisions to the charter) require a majority of three-quarters in
order to pass a vote, China possesses de facto (if not de jure) veto power.
That being said, this rule does not apply to decisions regarding current af-
fairs, for which a simple majority of votes cast would be enough. 
One of the major characteristics of this institution is that it is dominated
by developing or emerging Asian powers, rather than industrial economies.
This is a clear reflection of the shifting balance of power, but not only in
China’s favour: 75% of the capital is in fact held by emerging or developing
Asian economies, (26) and nine of the 12 members of the management com-
mittee are Asian.
Alongside the AIIB, another project that deserves mention – despite having
gone largely unnoticed – is the “Silk Road Fund,” created on 29 December
2014. This 40-billion dollar fund, supported by two major Chinese banks
(the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, or CDB)
as well as by two sovereign wealth funds that manage the country’s foreign
exchange reserves (the China Investment Corporation – CIC – and the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange – SAFE), in some ways resembles the
International Finance Corporation, which, as part of the World Bank group,
is in charge of encouraging private sector development by acquiring equity
in companies. (27) The goal for this new fund is to acquire equity in projects
that fit into the vast plan for a new Silk Road (both by sea and on land,
known as One Belt, One Road). The fund, which is exclusively Chinese (unlike
the AIIB), has been placed under the supervision of the People’s Bank of
China. 
The first project to be financed by the Fund is the Karot Hydropower Proj-
ect in Pakistan, the construction of which has been entrusted to a company
called China Three Gorges South Asia Investment Ltd., a subsidiary of the
China Three Gorges Corporation. This is the first in a series of clean energy
construction projects in Pakistan, carried out under the aegis of a larger
project: the China-Pakistan economic corridor, launched in May 2013 by
Prime Minister Li Keqiang. The initiative envisages the construction of roads,
railways, and energy projects that connect the deep-sea port of Gwadar, in
south-west Pakistan, with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in
north-western China.
Finally, during a visit to the United States in autumn 2015, President Xi
Jinping announced the creation of a $2 billion development assistance fund
to help the world’s poorest countries and “put justice before interests.” This
initiative, while seemingly modest in scale, is without doubt a response to
criticisms from the West that China is insufficiently involved in aiding the
world’s least developed countries, and that when it does grant economic
aid, it consistently puts its own economic and strategic interests first.
Interpreting China’s initiatives 
Multiple goals
The institutional innovations supported by China (the New Development
Bank, the development assistance fund, the AIIB, the BRICS Fund, and the
Silk Road Fund) provide a means to circumvent the global economy’s gov-
ernance system, which has thus far been dominated by the major Western
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powers. These projects are indisputably part of a strategy that is no longer
simply reformist, but revisionist. (28) The same applies to Beijing’s efforts to
confer the yuan with international reserve currency status. That said, these
initiatives could also reflect a desire on China’s part to assume the respon-
sibility that comes with increased economic influence, and to contribute
to the existing order – or even to make it more effective – rather than chal-
lenge it. That is, in any case, its official stance. As China’s Minister of Finance,
Lou Jiwei, points out, “China needs to demonstrate its desire to assume
greater international responsibility in promoting economic development in
Asia, and beyond that, in the rest of the world.” (29) This desire is perfectly in
line with Xi Jinping’s pronouncements on “the great renewal of the Chinese
nation,” which requires China’s foreign policy to “strive to achieve success”
(fenfa youwei 奋发有为). (30)
Still, make no mistake about it: above all, these projects directly serve to
further China’s interests, be they political or economic. The AIIB project is
thus in perfect alignment with President Xi Jinping’s flagship initiative
known as “One Belt, One Road” (yidai yilu 一带一路) and indeed with the
New Silk Roads (heading by land towards Central Asia, and by sea towards
Southeast Asia), whose purpose is to strengthen rail, road, and maritime
communications between China, East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East,
and Europe. It appears that the AIIB is one of the tools being used to put
this vast plan into action. In fact, both projects were launched simultane-
ously, even though an official connection between them has never been
made. (31)
In the capacity of a traditional development bank, the AIIB’s objective is
to fund infrastructure investments in the Asia-Pacific region as a matter of
priority. But beyond the objective of aiding development, China – as the
principal contributor – also intends to expand its influence in the region
and to occupy a central role. In this respect, whatever China’s leaders may
claim, there is no doubt that the AIIB is establishing itself as a competitor
to the Asian Development Bank, over which Japan has majority control. 
Beyond the obvious geopolitical dimension, the AIIB project also falls
under the rationale of rebalancing the Chinese economy. (32) In this respect,
it is perfectly aligned with China’s immediate interests (and therefore has
every chance of succeeding, since the authorities will devote all their efforts
to it). The authorities’ prime objective is to be able to maintain a growth
rate that is strong enough and steady enough to ensure social stability, and
in doing so to ensure the regime’s survival. Stabilising the Chinese economy
is therefore a priority. 
The problem that China must face up to is the following: having progres-
sively accumulated currency reserves and low-yield external assets, it is
now forced to increase its higher-yield assets. The launch of the AIIB should
help to achieve that; in any case, it falls perfectly in line with the strategy
China has employed thus far through swap agreements. 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the People’s Bank
of China signed a series of bilateral currency swap agreements with a variety
of central banks, particularly in emerging economies. As previously men-
tioned, this policy’s most notable intention was to promote diversification
among international currency reserves and the internationalisation of the
yuan, but it would also allow the profitability of Chinese financial resources
to be maximised. To understand this point, which is essential to the rebal-
ancing of China’s economy, it is necessary to examine the criteria that China
used to select its partners for the swap agreements. Unlike the United
States, which acted “conservatively” and focused on “reliable” partners while
excluding countries that were seen as risky (for example, those that had al-
ready defaulted, such as Argentina), China did not rule out these partners,
and focused on the nature of the economic ties that it had with each re-
cipient country when making its decision. The agreements, which were
swiftly passed with trade partners, tended to reinforce the positive correla-
tion that has been observed between the flow of Chinese direct investment
in a country and China’s importing of basic commodities from that same
country. From the 2008 crisis onwards, it became clear that thanks to these
agreements, a number of emerging countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin Amer-
ica were given access to infrastructures that were financed and built with
Chinese resources in exchange for exporting commodities to China. In other
words, with these swap agreements China pursued a rebalancing strategy
that above all prioritised the profitability of its resources, thanks to its ability
to access commodity goods and natural resources. These agreements were
part of a broader strategy that could be described as mercantilist, and which
combines the flow of direct investment abroad with the export of manu-
factured products and the import of commodities. Insofar as it will help to
fund infrastructure projects in countries with trade links to China and with
natural resources that are desirable for the Chinese economy, the AIIB fol-
lows the same strategy. (33)
In the same way, the diversification of China’s external assets in the form
of FDIs, particularly via sovereign wealth funds or the Silk Road Fund, is in-
tended to improve their return and contribute to the rebalancing process. 
It is still too soon to say whether this strategy will pay off, and the fact
that some of Beijing’s partners are countries with a recent history of de-
faulting could carry a certain risk, even if China has partially protected itself
by planning for repayments in kind further down the line.
Initiatives taken through necessity, not choice
China’s aggressive stance over the last few years can be explained partly
by the country’s renewed sense of self-confidence and a growing awareness
of the role that it can and must play in the world, and also by the fact that
the world’s established powers seem reluctant to admit that the balance
of power has shifted. 
Firstly, it should be noted that the reluctance in the West (and mostly in
America) to recognise the growing influence of China and other large
emerging economies, and to offer them the space that their size would ap-
pear to necessitate within the existing IFIs, (34) will only encourage these
economies to take a more offensive strategy and to establish systems of
economic governance that are more in line with their interests and with
the new balance of global power. Secondly, the international circumstances
marked by the relative weakening of the United States in the wake of the
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2008-09 financial crisis may well have strengthened the emerging
economies’ determination to consider alternative solutions. Under these
conditions, BRICS countries (and China especially) have launched a great
many new initiatives, and their goals have become more resolute. 
Moreover, since the so-called dominant powers – led by the United States
– have not always been exemplary in their dealings with developing coun-
tries, they have managed to alienate some of these countries’ senior figures,
unwittingly providing China with a perfect opportunity to step in – and
China has wasted no time in doing so. The fact that interventions by the
World Bank in certain Southeast Asian (and African) economies were re-
ceived very unfavourably explains why these countries were, at least to
begin with, extremely receptive to the arrival of a new figure that seemed
to better understand and share their concerns, and dealt with things in a
way that seemed better suited to their needs. It is not certain that China
has been able to take full advantage of these opportunities, because in many
cases the developing partners are starting to become disillusioned. However,
what is not in question is that China seems to have become fully aware
that the multilateral approach is now a wiser choice than the previously
preferred bilateral approach.
Playing the multilateralism card 
Indeed, the AIIB’s multilateral nature is what sets it apart: this means that
the initiative plays a greater structural role in the global economy, but also
gives a clear signal that Beijing feels an increased sense of responsibility. 
Henceforth, China will play a pivotal role in the global economy, and in
development aid in particular. As a part of this, in spring 2015 the Chinese
government was preparing to draw $62 billion from its immense currency
reserves (which amount to nearly $4,000 billion in total) and invest them
in the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, both
of which are principally intended to support its international aid policy. On
a more general level, China’s influence in funding development was now ir-
refutable: in Latin America for example, in the year 2010 alone, loans made
by China through the two aforementioned banks were greater than loans
from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Ex-
port-Import Bank of the United States put together. (35) Clearly, therefore,
China was already indirectly influencing the global economic order. 
Under these conditions, China’s transition to a multilateral approach is
truly remarkable. It is, in fact, one way in which the AIIB amounts to a rev-
olution, because for the first time, China is seeking to exert its influence
through multilateral channels, rather than through its preferred national
agents (in particular the Exim Bank of China and China Development Bank).
To oppose that would mean encouraging China to steer back onto its old
bilateral course, and without any safeguards, at that; so there is little doubt
that the multilateral option is the lesser evil. In this respect, the Silk Road
Fund is potentially a more dangerous tool, because it serves China’s interests
more directly.
By making the transition to a multilateral approach, the Chinese author-
ities are showing that they are prepared to give up going it alone, and indeed
even to accept a certain amount of advice from their peers. It is therefore
highly likely that the reservations expressed by a number of Western au-
thorities (that the AIIB does not conform to established practices) have been
exaggerated. Within this institution, it is especially in China’s interests to
establish its credibility as a responsible member of the international system.
What’s more, by making use of this institution to protect its own interests,
China is in fact acting no differently from the way the United States and
Great Britain before them behaved when they dominated the global econ-
omy.
A successful charm offensive 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the success of the AIIB is almost certainly
assured, given the support it has received not only from industrial countries,
many of whom are allies of the United States, but also from various other
nations within the region, be they small developing economies such as Cam-
bodia, for example, which sees in the AIIB a way to avoid face-to-face con-
frontation with the World Bank, of whom it is less than fond, or emerging
economies such as Indonesia, which consider China’s ambitions in the re-
gion to be perfectly in line with their own desire to wield greater influence
within the region’s balance of power. (36)
Beyond China’s ability to convince its partners that they, too, can benefit
from its project, its success can also be explained by one simple fact: the
AIIB is responding to a real demand, so wide is the gulf between Asia’s in-
frastructure requirements (estimated by the Asian Development Bank – ADB
– to be $8,000 billion between now and 2020) and the resources available
via the World Bank and the ADB.
In summary, the AIIB allows China to kill several birds with one stone: it
can prove its willingness to assume the responsibilities that come with its
status as a superpower, it can win favour with certain neighbouring coun-
tries and economic partners, and it can also recycle its trade and fiscal sur-
pluses in a profitable way.
The United States undoubtedly made a mistake in deciding to criticise
China’s initiative so publicly. By putting pressure on their Western partners,
and not only on them, the American government (which has been criticised
by a number of experts and political leaders such as Robert Zoellick, Ben
Bernanke, and Joseph Stiglitz, (37) to name only a few) ended up giving world-
wide publicity to China’s proposal, and what’s more, made the proposal ap-
pear as a challenge to the overarching influence of the United States and
IFIs under the influence of the West. Beyond a lack of tact, America’s reac-
tion mainly ended up drawing attention to its own weaknesses, and pushed
Beijing’s success even further into the spotlight.
Conclusion: Chinese pragmatism is alive and
well
The dynamic of China’s increasing power and growing influence over the
global economy is now an undeniable reality. The various initiatives that
China has recently employed amount to a kind of institutionalisation of
this influence, but it must be noted that even without these initiatives,
China was already a force to be reckoned with in the global economy.
As a result of reluctance in the West, and in America in particular, to recog-
nise this new state of affairs, China was forced to take the initiative itself,
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but as we have seen, its goal is not so much to revolutionise the global eco-
nomic order as it is to make it more efficient. But for China, the more im-
portant issue is to equip itself with the resources that will allow it to pursue
its own development and prove itself a responsible contributor on the global
economic scene. The fact that the Indonesian President voiced his support
of the AIIB at the summit marking the 60th anniversary of the Bandung
Asian-African Conference (38) suggests that this new project could fall in line
with the same approach: that of challenging the established order and al-
lowing developing countries to take control of their own destiny. However,
this may not be the case. At this stage, the priority for China is to pursue its
own interests, but its strategy does not appear to include setting any reg-
ulations. In this respect it is different from the United States, which is hoping
to create a new regulatory framework for international trade in the broadest
sense of the term via the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
That being said, China’s recent tactics reflect a clear desire not to let the
United States alone dominate the global economy, and on the contrary, to
take steps to establish “new systems of governance and international co-
operation.” (39) These systems are, however, as yet undefined, and it would
seem that they will solidify over time. Beijing is taking advantage of its as-
sets (and its financial clout in particular) to better position its chess pieces,
but this remains an experimental strategy, with an end goal that is ulti-
mately vague (or perhaps has been deliberately allowed to appear vague).
The all-fronts offensive of the New Silk Road and “One Belt, One Road” is
typical of this strategic vagueness, even if it is built upon a plethora of en-
tirely tangible projects. By means of these projects, China could succeed
gradually in becoming a central figure of global economic governance. Only
time will tell whether China’s pragmatic strategy will win out over Wash-
ington’s more ideological approach, and whether a genuinely new global
economic order emerges as a result.
z Translated by David Buchanan.
z Françoise Nicolas is director of the Centre for Asian Studies at the
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